Most recently, Kan Yang et al. proposed an attribute-keyword based encryption scheme for data publish-subscribe service(AKPS), which is highly useful for cloud storage scenario. Unfortunately, we discover that there is a flaw in the security proof of indistinguishability of the tag and trapdoor against chosen keyword attack under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption. As the security proof is a key component for a cryptographic scheme, based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, we improve the security proof method and give a new security proof of the AKPS scheme for indistinguishability of the tag and trapdoor in our proposal, which is more rigorous than the original one. Furthermore, we also demonstrate that the AKPS scheme is secure against data Replayable Chosen Ciphertext Attack (RCCA).
I. Introduction
Data publish-subscribe system [1, 2] is an appropriate mode for data users to receive data for interest. Cloud server, owing to considerable resources on storage and calculation, has been proven to be the most applicable platform for this service [3] [4] [5] .
To realize fine-grained access control of data on cloud storage, the concept of the attributebased encryption (ABE) was proposed. Generally ABE can be divided into two categories: Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE) [6, 7] and Key-Policy Attributebased Encryption (KP-ABE) [8] , both are intended for one-to-many access mode. Attributebased encryption is an extension of public-key cryptography and identity-based cryptography. Compared with traditional cryptography, attribute-based encryption provides a more flexible encryption and decryption relationship. For example, in an attribute-based encryption mechanism, both the ciphertext and the secret key are associated with a set of attributes, and the data owner can specify an encryption policy consisting of attributes, and the resulting ciphertext can be decrypted only by the data user whose attributes satisfies the encryption policy. The non-interactive access control with fine-grained can be realized effectively by attribute-based encryption, which greatly enriches the flexibility of encryption policy and the description of a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111 user's rights. Due to its high efficiency, dynamic, flexibility and privacy, attribute-based encryption has a good application foreground in distributed file management, third party data storage and pay-TV system. With the development and popularization of cloud computing technology, more and more enterprises and users are outsourcing their data to cloud service providers, which providing a good way to protect data security and privacy by applying attribute-based encryption.
In [9, 10] , a Dual-policy ABE was created to achieve CP-ABE and KP-ABE simultaneously, and it was appropriate for data publish-subscribe system as it enables the publishers and the subscribers to define individual policy according to the feature. A publish-subscribe system should meet the following requirements. (i) The publisher publishes data and specifies which subscribers can access his/her data and the subscriber may specify the data he/she is interested in; (ii) Allow subscribers to perform multiple keyword search; (iii) Search queries that allow multiple users to retrieve data. Considering data privacy, the keyword privacy in the tag and trapdoor and the decryption overhead from the subscriber, Kan Yang proposed a privacy-preserving attribute-keyword based data publish-subscribe (AKPS) scheme [1] . Firstly, the AKPS scheme implemented the access policy and subscription policy respectively by using dual policy attribute-based encryption, which could make the subscriber's attributes satisfy the publisher's access policy and the data released by the publisher also satisfied subscription policy specified by the subscriber. In this way, the AKPS scheme could achieve the fine-grained twoway access control. Secondly, by using the concept of attribute-keyword, the subscriber's subscription policy was constructed, which was designed to avoid the leaking of keywords information and realized the multi-keyword search and the expression of subscription policy. Thirdly, attribute-keyword based data publish-subscribe scheme supported multiple publishers and multiple subscribers, and could be used to data sharing with access control in publishsubscribe system on cloud platforms. Finally, the decryption overhead was transferred from the subscribers' devices to the cloud supporter to reduce the subscriber's computational burden by using outsourcing decryption technology [11] [12] [13] , which was a practical tool for lightening the computational load on the subscriber side in reality result from that mobile devices have become primary computing device for many users and enterprises.
Unfortunately, we discovered that the security proof of the AKPS scheme [1] was not enough rigorous and adequate after carefully researching it. According to the security proof of the AKPS scheme [1] , we find with random guessing, the adversary can solve the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem with a probability of 1/2, and their security proof actually has nothing to do with the adversary's attacking of the scheme (the detail is refer to section IV). Through analyzing the security of the original AKPS scheme [1] , we also find it is hard to apply the BDH assumption to the security proof of the AKPS scheme. Therefore in order to prove the security of the chosen keyword attack for indistinguishability of the tag and the trapdoor for the AKPS scheme, we carry out a detailed analysis of the AKPS scheme and study the basic steps of the provable security method. Through careful analysis and research, we discover that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption can be used to prove the security of the AKPS scheme.
In view of this, we improve the proof method and design a new security proof of the AKPS scheme for indistinguishability of the tag and trapdoor based on the DDH assumption, our new security proof is more rigorous than their original proof. In addition, Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA) security [12, 14] was regarded as the appropriate security notion for encryption schemes used as components in general protocols and applications. Whereas, there exists a weaker secure notion called Replayable Chosen Ciphertext Attack (RCCA) [15] security than the CCA security, and has been proven to be sufficient for most actual intention. In this paper we prove that the data security of the AKPS scheme is of RCCA security, which is not presented in [1] .
Our Contributions
(1) We show that the security proof of the AKPS scheme [1] is not enough rigorous and adequate, and we give a detail analysis about it in section IV.
(2) We improve the security proof method and present a new security proof of the AKPS scheme for indistinguishability of the tag and trapdoor based on the DDH assumption.
(3) Using the conclusion that the Waters's scheme in [6] is the selectively CPA-secure, we can prove that the AKPS scheme realizes data security against replayable chosen ciphertext attack (RCCA).
In order to make the overall layout of the system clearer, the flaw-chart of the system is shown in Fig 1. 
II. Preliminaries
In this section, we present the basics of mathematics and cryptography required in the scheme, including the deterministic assumptions used in the proof, system model of the AKPS scheme and the security definition of the AKPS scheme.
A. Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption
Definition 1 (DDH [16] ).Let x,y,z2Z p be chosen at random and g be a generator of G. The Decisional DH assumption is that there is no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm P can distinguish the tuple (A = g 
B. Decision q-parallel
It must be hard to distinguish a valid tuple eðg; gÞ a qþ1 s 2 G T from a random element R in
C. System model of AKPS
At the beginning, we give some notations that will appear in the AKPS scheme as shown in Table 1 .
The system model of the data publish-subscribe service on cloud platforms as shown in Fig  2. It consists mainly of four entities: Authority, data publishers, data subscribers, and cloud server. The authority is responsible for establishing the system and generating private keys for data publishers and data subscribers, respectively. The publisher, on the one hand, encrypts data under an access policy about attributes and obtains data ciphertext; on the other hand, encrypts a set of keywords with his/her private key to generate the data tags. The data ciphertext and data tags are then uploaded to the cloud server. The subscriber defines a subscription policy for a set of keywords and uses it to generate search trapdoor, and uses his/her private key to generate the pre-decryption key. The search trapdoor and pre-decryption key are then uploaded to the cloud server. The cloud servers can provide storage and computing services for users because of their considerable storage and computing resources. After receiving the data ciphertext and data tags from the publisher and the search trapdoor and pre-decryption key from the subscriber, the cloud server first conducts the access policy test and the subscription policy test, if and only if the subscriber's attributes satisfy the publisher's access policy and the publisher's tags satisfies the subscriber's subscription policy, the cloud server uses the subscriber's pre-decryption key to pre-decrypt the ciphertext, and sends the pre-decrypted data to the subscriber. The subscriber then decrypts the pre-decrypted data using his/her private key to get the plaintext data.
D. Security definition of AKPS
Definition 3 (Td-IND-CKA-Game).Trapdoor indistinguishability security against chosen keyword attacks (Td-IND-CKA) is described in detail in Definition 6 of [1] . Definition 4 (Tag-IND-CKA-Game). Tag indistinguishability security against chosen keyword attacks (Tag-IND-CKA) is described in detail in Definition 7 of [1] .
Definition 5 (Data-RCCA [11] ). The AKPS scheme is Data-RCCA secure if there is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary who can win in Data-RCCA-Game.
Definition 6 (Data-RCCA-Game [11] ).The Data-RCCA-Game involves a challenger C Λ and an adversary A as follows.
Setup: The challenger C Λ runs the setup algorithm and gives the public key pk to the adversary A, but does not divulge master secret key msk.
Phase 1: The challenger C Λ initializes an empty set D and an empty table T respectively, setting an integer j = 0. The adversary A makes the following adaptive query to C Λ .
CreatðS sub j Þ : The challenger C Λ sets j≔j+1. It runs the key generation algorithm and predecryption algorithm on S sub j to obtain the pair ðdk sub j ; pdk sub j Þ and stores the entry 
Phase 2:
The response is the same as Phase 1 with the following restrictions:
• A cannot conduct a corrupt query that S sub i satisfies (M � ,ρ � ).
• no decryption queries on the message m 0 or m 1 . The security of the AKPS scheme (Fig 3) encompasses the following two facets. On the one hand, Td-IND-CKA security and Tag-IND-CKA security can be reduced to the DDH assumption. On the other hand, regarding Data-RCCA security, this can be reduced to the security of Waters scheme [6] .
Guess: The adversary

III. Brief Review of AKPS
We briefly review the AKPS scheme below, which mainly contains five phases: System initialization, Trapdoor generation, Data publication, Policy checking and Pre-decryption, and Data decryption. For a detailed introduction to the scheme, please refer to [1] . 
TdGen(sk sub ,pk,(M t ,ρ t ))!(Td sub ,pkd sub ,dk sub ). To subscribe some interested data, the subscriber first defines an access structure as (M t ,ρ t ), where M t is a n t ×l t subscription matrix with ρ t mapping its rows to keywords. The subscriber first generates a decryption key dk sub = z t by selecting a random number z t 2 Z In order to protect the keyword leakage from the subscription policy, only M t of the subscription policy (M t ,ρ t ) will be sent to the cloud together with the trapdoor, while ρ t is kept secret against the cloud server. The pre-decryption key pdk sub is generated as pdk sub ¼ ðK
Encrypt(m,S m ,pk,sk pub , (M,ρ))!(C m ,T m ). To publish data, the publisher first defines an access policy over attributes of subscribers. The access policy is also described by an LSSS structure as (M,ρ), where M is an n×l access matrix and ρ maps the rows of M to attributes. The publisher then runs the following encryption algorithm to encrypt the data, which contains part of the two. Similarly, it further computes TK 2 from the ciphertext by using the pre-decryption key as 
IV. Analysis on the security proof of AKPS
In this section, we give a detail analysis about the security proof of the AKPS scheme [1] , and point out the flaw of their security proof in [1] . In order to make it clearer, we will name the theorems in the AKPS scheme as Theorem 1, Theorem 2, Theorem 3, and name the security proof of our theorems in section V as Theorem 1', Theorem 2', and Theorem 3'. The security proof of the AKPS scheme [1] is based on the hardness of the BDH problem, and we find that the security proof of the AKPS scheme is not rigorous and adequate. In the AKPS scheme, Theorem 1 is about the Td-IND-CKA security of the AKPS scheme, it is proved in the random oracle model under the BDH assumption. The BDH assumption and assumption 1 in [1] are as follows.
BDH assumption: Let A be an attacker whose running time is polynomial in a security parameter k. Given a tuple (g,g In their proof, the challenger C interacts with the adversary A to conduct the security game. Let's recall the proof procedure of Theorem 1 about Td-IND-CKA.
Firstly, the challenger C sets master key msk = (g a ,α,β,γ) and public key pk = (g,G, In the challenge phase, the challenger C conducts the simulation of trapdoor corresponding the keyword vectors are submitted by the adversary A. Subsequently, the adversary A needs to compute eðg; gÞ bgat j as the solution to the BDH problem, where given the BDH tuple as
After challenger C gives the challenge trapdoor Td 
The adversary A then outputs a random guess b 0 of b, if b 0 = b, it means that the adversary A calculates the solution of the BDH problem. Since it is a random guess, the guessing probability of this case is 1/2. If b 0 6 ¼ b, it means that the adversary A does not calculate the solution of the BDH problem, and the probability of this case is also 1/2. Therefore, the adversary A can solve the BDH problem with a probability of 1/2, but did not attack the real AKPS scheme. In other words, the adversary A has no advantage in the attack of the scheme and it does not need to interact with C. The only thing that needs the adversary A to do is just a random guess b 0 of b. From the above analysis, we can obtain the conclusion that the security proof of the AKPS scheme is not adequate.
Similarly, it's the same as theorem 1 in theorem 2, which is about the security of the Tag-IND-CKA.
The theorem 3 of the AKPS scheme [1] is that the AKPS is Data-CPA secure in the random oracle if the decision q-parallel BDHE assumption holds. In Theorem 3, the outsourcing decryption technology of the AKPS scheme is based on the technique in [11] . Specifically, to enable the cloud server to pre-decrypt the data, the pre-decryption key generation algorithm is constructed by employing the technique from [11] , which is proven to be semantic security against chosen plaintext attacks by using literature [6] . Similarly, the AKPS scheme can be proven to be Data-CPA secure, nevertheless the original AKPS scheme [1] dose not gives specific proof. Through researching the literature [11] , we conclude that the security proof in [11] is reduced to Waters scheme [6] , which is proven to be Data-RCCA secure. Therefore, using the proof method in [6] , we demonstrate Data-RCCA security on the AKPS scheme, and the specific proof can be found in Theorem 3' of Part V.
V. Improving the security Proof of AKPS
In this section, we will give our new security proof of the AKPS scheme about the security of the trapdoor and tag. In addition, we give a new security proof of the Data-RCCA security for the AKPS scheme.
Loosely speaking, the security proof of a cryptographic scheme can be described as follows. A pre-defined difficult problem is deployed by the challenger, and the adversary is supposed to attack the constructed scheme in a security game. The challenger interacts with the adversary to conduct the security game, and inserts the difficulty problem into the scheme. Only if the adversary attacks the scheme successfully with a non-negligible advantage, then the challenger can figure out the difficulty problem correctly with a non-negligible advantage. So if the difficulty problem is really hard to solve then the constructed scheme is secure. Our security proof of the AKPS scheme is based on the DDH assumption in this section. The new security proofs are given as theorem 1' and theorem 2', where theorem 1' is about Td-IND-CKA secure, and theorem 2' is about Tag-IND-CKA secure. While theorem 3' is about Data-RCCA secure which is a complete new proof for the security of AKPS scheme [1] . Our security proof is different from the original one in [1] , one of the main differences is that our proof is under the DDH assumption while their proof is BDH assumption, as we cannot apply the BDH assumption to the security proof of the AKPS scheme [1] .
Td-IND-CKA Security
Theorem 1'.The AKPS scheme is Td-IND-CKA secure in the random oracle model if the DDH problem is intractable.
Proof. Suppose that there is an adversary A 1 with non-negligible advantage ε 1 in the Td-INK-CKA Game against the construction of AKPS scheme in [1] . We build a simulator S 1 that can figure out the DDH problem with advantage ε 1 /2, the simulation proceeds as follows. Let the challenger C 1 generates public parameter (e,g,G,G T ) and G = <g>. C 1 flips a fair binary coin φ2{0,1} outside of S ) and sends it to A 1 . In addition, S 1 generates respectively private key sk pub and sk sub for publisher and subscriber as 
VI. Conclusion
We analyze the security proof of AKPS scheme [1] for indistinguishability of tag and trapdoor and show that the security proof of the AKPS scheme is not rigorous and adequate, although the construction of AKPS scheme is remarkable. Based on it, we give an improving security proof of AKPS scheme for its Tag-IND-CKA security and Td-IND-CKA security based on the DDH assumption. Furthermore, by using of the conclusion that the Waters scheme in [6] is selectively CPA-secure, we manifest that the AKPS scheme realizes data replayable secure against replayable chosen ciphertext attack (RCCA), which has a higher level of security than the security of the indistinguishability of the Data-CPA in original AKPS scheme, which is mentioned but not demonstrated. Moreover, there are a number of issues that need to be studied and solved for the attribute-keyword based data publish-subscribe scheme on the cloud platforms. Firstly, new AKPS scheme should be designed to cope with the situation that a subscription policy is spelled with mistakes of interesting words, for example, 'compute' may be spelled as 'compote' or 'compue'. Secondly, for the situations where the subscriber's attributes may have been changed, such as revoke, update, increase etc, how to design efficient attribute revocation and update algorithm to realize the dynamic management of attributes, and protect the forward and backward security of the algorithm is a promising study topics. Thirdly, in publish-subscribe system, how to add the concept of time into the access policy to avoid illegal data access in the case of private key is leaked. These three aspects will be the focus of our future work. 
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